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END OF THE ROAD
Sherman was tenacious, but Johnston was the better negotiator
Carmichael, Peter S.
Winter 2001

Bradley, Mark L. This Astounding Close: The Road to Bennett Place.
University of North Carolina Press, 2000-09-01. ISBN 807825654
In the popular imagination, the image of Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant
amicably discussing surrender terms in William McLean's parlor on April 9,
1865, symbolizes the end of the Civil War. The subsequent proceedings at
Bennett Place, North Carolina, have often been an obscure footnote to the story
of the Confederacy's collapse, even though Joseph E. Johnston's negotiations
with William T. Sherman resulted in the surrender of 90,000 Confederates, the
largest of the War.
In a superb study that incorporates the best of new military history, Mark L.
Bradley makes it clear that Johnston's surrendering of the Army of Tennessee
was not an inevitable consequence of Appomattox, nor an event of limited
significance. In its discussion of the 1865 North Carolina campaign, This
Astounding Close outlines the contours of the armies' movements, paying close
attention to the logistical concerns and political pressures facing both generals.
With tremendous care, Bradley shows how North Carolina civilians interacted
and shaped the operations of the Confederate and Union armies.
Although many Tar Heels were weary of the War, Bradley puts to rest the
notion that North Carolinians had abandoned the cause. Even the controversial
Governor Zebulon Vance comes across in Bradley's pages as a devoted
Confederate, not as a states' rights obstructionist. He energetically supported
national armies whenever possible, delivering patriotic speeches while searching
for ways to supply Southern forces without imposing civilian hardship. He did
not want to drive his fellow Tar Heels out of the Confederacy through
excessively intrusive measures. Bradley's provocative interpretation of Vance
underscores the need for a re-evaluation of the governor's wartime career.
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In the case of Sherman, Bradley assumes a more critical stance. Allowing
the Confederate army to escape after the battle of Bentonville on March 19
enabled Johnston to take his army into the interior of the state, from where the
Confederate commander advocated a linkage with Lee's Army of Northern
Virginia. Johnston, it appears, had learned from the mistake of dispersing
Confederate forces at Vicksburg. Lee and Confederate authorities, on the other
hand, were preoccupied with Richmond, missing an opportunity to unite their
forces with the Army of Tennessee's 30,000 men, which if combined would have
put more than 80,000 men in the field. Had Lee been at the helm of such an
army, Bradley believes the War could have been extended indefinitely.
Even after Lee's surrender, Johnston negotiated from a position of strength,
largely because his smaller and more mobile army was beyond Sherman's
immediate reach. Over the adamant protests of Jefferson Davis, Johnston
courageously initiated negotiations with Sherman and relentlessly pursued his
goal of stopping the bloodshed. When Washington authorities voided Sherman's
more liberal concessions, granted in the initial surrender meetings, Johnston
remained firm that his men take home their draft animals, field transportation,
and one-seventh of their rifle muskets. Unlike Sherman, whom Bradley criticizes
for failing to understand the political climate after Lincoln's assassination,
Johnston was far more astute about the realities facing the South. In navigating
the ebbing but treacherous political waters of the Confederacy, Johnston gained
favorable terms for his men, maybe his most impressive and lasting contribution
to the Civil War.
Peter S. Carmichl is an assistant professor of history at University of North
Carolina at Greensboro. He is the author of Lee's Young Artillerist: William R.
J. Pegram (1995), and is currently finishing a study of student youth in 1850s
Virginia.
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